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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr 
ADVERSE POSSESSION 
POSSESSION. The plaintiffs owned property to the south of the 
defendant’s	crop	field.	Between	the	properties	ran	a	road	or	path	with	
telephone poles to the north of the road. The previous owners of the 
plaintiff’s	property	built	a	house	on	their	property	and	garage	on	a	
portion of the disputed strip, which included the road and a strip of 
grass up to the poles. the previous owners mowed the grass strip, 
stored wood and used a burn barrel on parts of the strip. Although 
the defendants acquiesced in the plaintiffs acquisition of the road 
by adverse possession, the defendants argued that the use of the 
grass strip was so minor that passage of title to the grass strip by 
adverse possession was not proper. The court held that continuous 
possession of every inch of a disputed strip was not required; 
therefore,	 the	plaintiffs’	and	 their	predecessors’	use	of	 the	grass	
strip	was	sufficient	to	include	passage	of	title	to	the	strip	with	the	
road by adverse possession. The case is designated as unpublished. 
Stevens v. Howard, 2006 Wisc. App. LEXIS 455 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2006), 
BANKRuPTCy 
GENERAL 
DISASTER PAyMENTS.	The	debtors	filed	a	Chapter	7	plan	
in August 2002 and received a discharge in December 2002. 
In February 2003, the U.S. Congress enacted the Agricultural 
Assistance Act of 2003 which provided crop disaster relief for 
2001 and 2002 crop disaster losses. After the bankruptcy case was 
closed, the debtor applied for the disaster relief in August 2003 and 
a check was sent to the bankruptcy trustee. The case was reopened 
for a determination as to whether the payment was estate property. 
The court held that the disaster payments were not estate property 
because	the	debtor’s	right	to	the	payment	did	not	arise	until	after	
the	petition	was	filed.	The	trustee	argued	that	the	crop	loss	was	the	
key action which gave rise to a contingent property right which 
merely vested when the disaster relief law was enacted. Although 
acknowledging a split among courts on the issue, the court rejected 
that argument and agreed with those cases holding that such payments 
were not estate property. The court noted that the issue arises because 
Congress passes disaster relief programs which are retroactive which 
may provide for post-petition payments for pre-petition losses. The 
court noted that if Congress wished to avoid the result in similar cases, 
the protection of creditors could be included in the legislation. In 
re Burgess, 438 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2006), aff’g en banc, 392 F.3d 
782 (5th Cir. 2004). 
FEDERAL TAX 
DISCHARGE.	The	debtors	filed	a	Chapter	13	plan	in	1996	and	
sought to have their 1997 income taxes included in the claims covered 
by the Chapter 13 plan and discharge. The trustee and IRS objected 
so the debtors included an agreement in the plan that the 1997 taxes 
would not be discharged. Two years after that case was closed, the 
debtors	filed	another	Chapter	13	case,	with	the	1997	taxes	included	
as an unsecured, non-priority claim, eligible for discharge because 
due	more	than	three	years	before	the	filing	of	the	petition.	The	IRS	
argued that the three year period of Section 507(a)(8)(A)(i) was 
tolled	during	the	first	bankruptcy	case,	leaving	less	than	three	years	
for collection of the taxes. The court held that the prior bankruptcy 
case did toll the three year limitation period and that the taxes were 
nondischargeable in the second bankruptcy case. In re Brensing, 
337 B.R. 376 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006). 
POST-PETITION TAXES. The IRS has issued a revenue 
procedure providing the procedures for a bankruptcy trustee to request 
a	prompt	determination	of	a	bankruptcy	estate’s	tax	liability	incurred	
during the administration of the bankruptcy case. Rev. Proc. 2006-24, 
I.R.B. 2006-22, 943. 
FEDERAL AGRICuLTuRAL 
PROGRAMS 
COTTON. The CCC has issued proposed regulations amending 
regulations governing the cotton MarketingAssistance Loan Program 
authorized by the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002. 
The proposed changes include the outside storage of upland cotton 
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pledged	as	collateral	for	CCC	loans;	the	certification	provided	by	
approved ginners to produce bales that are compliant with CCC loan 
eligibility requirements; the re-concentration and transfer of upland 
cotton pledged as collateral for CCC loans; and the storage credit 
provided to producers when an upland cotton marketing assistance 
loan is repaid. 71 Fed. Reg. 30318 (May 26, 2006). 
EMERGENCy CONSERVATION PROGRAM. The FSA 
has issued proposed regulations amending the regulations for the 
Emergency Conservation Program to implement provisions of the 
Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriation to 
Address	Hurricanes	in	the	Gulf	of	Mexico,	and	Pandemic	Influenza	
Act, 2006 (Pub. L. 109-149) providing assistance to nursery, oyster, 
and poultry producers and non-industrial private forest landowners 
to rehabilitate public or private oyster reefs or farmland damaged 
by hurricanes during calendar year 2005. 71 Fed. Reg. 30263 (May 
26, 2006). 
FARM LOANS. The defendant applied for an FSA loan and 
at	the	loan	closing	stated	that	the	defendant’s	financial	condition	
had not changed since the time of the loan application, although 
the	defendant	had	sold	all	the	defendant’s	soybeans	just	before	the	
closing. The loan funds were restricted in that all withdrawals had 
to receive written FSA approval. Most of the funds were withdrawn 
with FSAapproval but the defendant managed to withdraw $27,000 
without FSA approval and used the funds for personal purposes. 
The defendant was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for 
making	a	false	financial	statement	and	with	violating	18	U.S.C.	§	
658 for converting property pledged to the FSA. A jury verdict was 
returned convicting the defendant on both counts. The defendant 
appealed both verdicts as not supported by the evidence. The court 
held that the false statement count was supported by evidence that 
the	defendant	knew	that	the	defendant’s	eligibility	for	the	loan	was	
a	close	question	and	that	any	change	in	financial	condition	would	
materially	affect	the	loan	qualification.	In	addition,	the	defendant	
had granted a security interest in all crops and knew that the sale 
of crops just before closing would substantially alter the security 
for the loan. In support of the other count, the court noted that the 
defendant had attempted to withdraw the funds from another branch 
of the bank and was turned down because FSAapproval was needed 
for withdrawal. With full knowledge of the conditions of the loan, 
the defendant approached another branch of the same bank and was 
able to convince them to allow withdrawal without FSA approval. 
united States v. Rice, 2006 u.S. App. LEXIS 13319 (8th Cir. 
2006). 
SuGAR. The CCC has issued a notice which sets forth the 
establishment and adjustments to the sugar overall allotment 
quantity (OAQ) for the 2005-crop year which runs from October 
1, 2005 through September 30, 2006. CCC set the 2005-crop OAQ 
at 8.600 million short tons raw value (STRV) on August 12, 2005. 
On August 19, 2005, CCC allocated the cane sector allotment 
to cane-producing states and cane processors and reassigned an 
expected cane supply shortfall of 120,000 STRV to imports. On 
September 29, 2005, CCC increased the OAQ to 8.825 million 
STRV and reassigned another 276,000 STRV of expected cane 
shortfall to imports. On December 2, 2006, CCC reassigned another 
450,000 STRV of an updated cane supply shortfall to imports. On 
February 2, 2006, CCC increased the OAQ to 9.350 million STRV
and reassigned 500,000 STRV of the anticipated domestic supply 
deficit	to	imports.	The	revised	FY	2006	cane	state	allotments	and	
cane and beet sugar processor allocations were announced on 
March 22, 2006. 71 Fed. Reg. 30373 (May 26, 2006). 
TOMATOES. The AMS has announced that it is soliciting 
comments on its proposal to revise the United States Standards 
for Grades of Greenhouse Tomatoes. The AMS is proposing to 
revise the standards to allow that percentages of defects and 
size	classifications	be	determined	by	count	 rather	 than	weight.	
This would result in a revision of the following sections of the 
standards:	Tolerances,	Size	Classification,	Standard	Pack,	Damage,	
and Serious Damage sections. Additionally, AMS is proposing to 
delete	the	“Unclassified”	section,	add	moldy	stems	as	a	damage	
defect, and add a scoring guide for damage and serious damage 
for skin checks. 71 Fed. Reg. 30860 (May 31, 2006). 
VETERINARIANS. The APHIS has issued proposed 
regulations which amend the regulations regarding the 
National Veterinary Accreditation Program to establish two 
accreditation categories in place of the current single category, 
to add requirements for supplemental training and renewal of 
accreditation, and to offer accreditation specializations. 71 Fed. 
Reg. 31109 (June 1, 2006). 
FEDERAL ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION 
FAMILy-OWNED BuSINESS DEDuCTION . The 
decedent’s	estate	included	stock	in	a	corporation.	The	estate	hired	
an	accounting	firm	to	prepare	the	estate	tax	return	and	to	value	
the stock. Based on the valuation provided by the accounting 
firm,	the	firm	determined	that	the	estate	was	not	eligible	for	the	
family-owned business deduction and the estate tax return was 
filed	without	the	deduction.	After	an	IRS	audit,	the	estate	agreed	
to increase the value of the stock for estate tax purposes and 
requested	an	extension	of	time	to	file	an	amended	return	which	
included the FOBD deduction. The extension was granted by the 
IRS. Ltr. Rul. 200620020, Feb. 6, 2006. 
IRA.	The	decedent’s	estate	included	an	IRA	which	passed	to	four	
beneficiaries.	The	taxpayer	was	one	of	the	beneficiaries	and	was	
disabled.	The	taxpayer’s	guardian	established	a	“special	needs”	
trust which gave the guardian, as trustee, complete discretion to 
pay or accumulate income. The trust was formed to remove the 
IRA	income	from	the	taxpayer’s	income	to	enable	the	taxpayer	
to	continue	to	be	eligible	for	Medicaid.	The	taxpayer’s	share	of	
the IRA was placed in the trust. The IRS ruled that the trust was 
a grantor trust; therefore, the contribution of the IRA to the trust 
was not considered a transfer under I.R.C. § 691(a)(2). Ltr. Rul. 
200620025, Feb. 21, 2006. 
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS. The 
decedent had placed most investment assets in a revocable trust 
for	the	decedent’s	benefit	but	after	the	decedent	became	mentally	
incapacitated, the decedent children, under an attorney-in-fact 
agreement, established a family limited partnership and transferred 
most of the trust assets to the new FLP. The court held that the 
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partnership	assets	were	included	in	the	decedent’s	estate	because	
the decedent, through the attorney-in-fact, retained the full 
economic	benefit	of	the	assets	under	an	implied	family	agreement.	
The implied agreement was found because (1) the FLP had no 
business activity and was designed merely for estate tax planning; 
(2)	the	decedent’s	relationship	with	the	assets	did	not	change;	
(3)	although	members	of	the	decedent’s	family	received	interests	
in the FLP, the assets were treated the same as if they were still 
in the trust, including the using of cash to make annual gifts to 
family	members	and	to	pay	the	decedent’s	living	expenses;	and	
(4) the decedent was elderly and in poor health when the assets 
were transferred. In addition, the court held that the FLP assets 
were included in the estate because the transfer was not a bona 
fide	sale	for	adequate	and	full	consideration.	The	same	factors	
above	were	also	used	 to	support	 the	 lack	of	a	bona	fide	sale.	
Estate of Rosen v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-115. 
FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 
BuSINESS EXPENSES.	The	 taxpayer’s	 business	 records	
were seized by the FBI in 1991 as part of a tax fraud investigation 
and were returned in 1995. The taxpayer claimed that the records 
for 1992 and 1993 were also taken by the FBI but no proof of that 
seizure was presented. The taxpayer claimed that, upon the return 
of	 the	records,	 the	 taxpayer’s	spouse	disposed	of	 the	records.	
Thus, the taxpayer had no written records to substantiate any 
business expenses for 1992 and 1993. The taxpayer attempted 
to present oral testimony as to rent and advertising expenses but 
the court found the testimony to be inconsistent and incomplete. 
The court noted that the expenses claimed would have left the 
taxpayer with only $960 in income for 1992 and noted that 
the taxpayer failed to explain how the taxpayer paid for living 
expenses during that year. The court upheld the IRS disallowance 
of most of the claimed expenses for lack of substantiation. Braun 
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-110. 
CAPITAL ASSETS. The taxpayer had won a state lottery 
and		received	annual	payments	for	five	years	before	assigning	
the remaining annual payments to a third party in exchange for 
a lump sum payment. The taxpayer reported the assignment as a 
sale of a capital asset with a tax basis of zero. The court, consistent 
with several prior cases, held that the lottery payments were not 
capital assets because there was no underlying investment by the 
taxpayer. Watkins v. Comm’r, 2006-1 u.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 
50,329 (10th Cir. 2006), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2004-244. 
COuRT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The taxpayer 
was	employed	as	a	special	education	teacher.	The	school	filed	
a suit to have the taxpayer placed on mandatory sick leave for 
mental illness. The parties reached a settlement which paid the 
taxpayer	$50,000	in	exchange	for	the	taxpayer’s	resignation	and	
release of all claims. The taxpayer did not include the settlement 
proceeds in income because the taxpayer claimed that the 
payments were for diabetes, inner ear pain, and impetigo suffered 
during employment. The court held that the settlement proceeds were 
taxable income because the settlement agreement has no mention of 
payment	for	physical	injury	and	the	taxpayer	did	not	file	any	claims	
in the law suit as to physical injuries. The court did not dispute that 
the taxpayer suffered from the medical conditions but held that 
the settlement proceeds were not paid as compensation for those 
conditions. Peck v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2006-86. 
DEFICIENCy NOTICES. The IRS sent written notices of income 
tax	deficiencies	to	the	taxpayer	when	the	taxpayer	failed	to	file	returns	
for several years. The taxpayer sent letters to the IRS in response 
to the notices and the letters made several frivolous “tax protester” 
arguments as to the illegality of the income tax. The taxpayer argued 
that the notices were defective in that they did not technically follow 
the procedures of the Internal Revenue Manual. The court held that 
the notices were proper in that they complied with I.R.C. § 6212. 
The court also approved a penalty under I.R.C. § 6673 for making 
frivolous arguments for the purpose of delaying the collection process. 
Wheeler v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-109. 
DISASTER LOSSES. On May 2, 2006, the president determined 
that certain areas in Connecticut are eligible for assistance from the 
government under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act 
(42 U.S.C. § 5121) as a result of record snowfall, which began on 
February 1, 2005. FEMA-3266-EM. OnApril 12, 2006, the president 
determined that certain areas in Arkansas are eligible for assistance 
from the government under the Act as a result of severe storms and 
tornadoes, which began on April 1, 2006. FEMA-1636-DR. On May 
17, 2006, the president determined that certain areas in Washington 
are eligible for assistance from the government under the Act as a 
result	of	severe	storms,	flooding,	tidal	surge,	landslides	and	mudslides,	
which began on January 27, 2006. FEMA-1641-DR. On May 25, 
2006, the president determined that certain areas in Massachusetts 
are eligible for assistance from the government under the Act as a 
result	of	severe	storms	and	flooding,	which	began	on	May	12,	2006.	
FEMA-1642-DR. On May 25, 2006, the president determined that 
certain areas in New Hampshire are eligible for assistance from the 
government under the Act	as	a	result	of	severe	storms	and	flooding,	
which began on May 12, 2006. FEMA-1643-DR. On May 25, 2006, 
the president determined that certain areas in Maine are eligible for 
assistance from the government under the Act as a result of severe 
storms	and	flooding,	which	began	on	May	13,	2006.	FEMA-1644-
DR. Taxpayers who sustained losses attributable to these disasters 
may deduct the losses on their 2005 returns. 
DISCHARGE OFINDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayer had owed the 
Securities	and	Exchange	Commission	a	civil	fine	resulting	from	the	
taxpayer’s	former	employment.	In	2001	the	SEC	formally	released	
the	taxpayer	from	liability	for	the	fine	and	issued	a	Form	1099-C,	
Cancellation	 of	 Debt,	 listing	 the	 fine	 as	 “Default on payment of 
penalty, disgorgement and interest.” The taxpayer did not include the 
amount	of	the	released	fine	in	income	and	claimed	that	the	taxpayer	
was	insolvent	when	the	fine	was	released.	The	taxpayer’s	2001	tax	
return claimed a business loss and no wages or other income. Trial 
evidence failed to identify any assets owned by the taxpayer except 
an old car with minimal value. The court held that the taxpayer was 
insolvent in 2001 and under I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(B), the discharge of 
the	fine	did	not	produce	taxable	income.	Editor’s comment: The case is 
a bit disturbing in that the court reported that the IRS admitted that it 
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“had	‘no	affirmative	knowledge’	of	any	assets	owned	by	petitioner,	
and this case was brought to trial ‘to at least see what she at one 
time	had	and	we	believe	 that	 she	could	get.’	 ”	 Coppertino v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2006-87. 
DIVORCE PAyMENTS.	 The	 taxpayer’s	 divorce	 decree	
with a prior spouse provided that the taxpayer would be the sole 
owner	of	the	taxpayer’s	marital	residence.	The	decree	denied	any	
support or maintenance payments to either party. The decree 
also provided that the taxpayer would be liable for the mortgage 
on	 the	 residence	 and	 that	 the	 payment	 of	 the	 former	 spouse’s	
share would be considered “in the nature of support” and non-
dischargeable	in	bankruptcy.	The	taxpayer’s	former	spouse	did	
not live in the property after the divorce. The taxpayer claimed an 
alimony	deduction	for	the	former	spouse’s	share	of	the	mortgage	
payments made by the taxpayer. The court held that, because the 
taxpayer was the sole owner of the property, lived in the property, 
was not required to pay the former spouse any maintenance, and 
the former spouse no longer lived in the property, the mortgage 
payments were not deductible as alimony. In addition, the court 
noted	that	the	former	spouse	received	no	continuing	benefit	from	
the payments because the former spouse had no ownership in the 
house under the decree. Picou v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 
2006-82. 
DOMESTIC PRODuCTION DEDuCTION. The IRS has 
adopted	as	final,	with	changes,	the	regulations	for	the	domestic	
production deduction, discussed in Harl and McEowen, “Proposed 
Regulations Issued on New Domestic Production Deduction,” 16 
Agric. L. Dig. 161. 71 Fed. Reg. 31267 (June 1, 2006). 
HyBRID VEHICLE TAX CREDIT. Effective for vehicles 
placed in service after December 31, 2005, an alternative motor 
vehicle	credit	is	allowed	which	is	the	sum	of	(1)	qualified	fuel	cell	
motor vehicle credit, (2) advanced lean burn technology motor 
vehicle	credit,	(3)	qualified	hybrid	motor	vehicle	credit,	and	(4)	
qualified	alternative	fuel	motor	vehicle	credit.	I.R.C.	§	30B(a).	
The credits allowed cannot exceed the regular tax reduced by 
other credits over the tentative minimum tax for the year. I.R.C. 
§ 30B(g)(2). The credits are treated as a general business credit 
if the vehicle is subject to an allowance for depreciation. I.R.C. § 
30B(g)(1).	The	IRS	has	announced	the	vehicle	certifications	and	
the credit amounts for seven vehicles for the alternative motor 
vehicle	 credit,	 which	 will	 expire	 in	 the	 first	 calendar	 quarter	
after the quarter in which Honda records its sale of the 60,000th 
vehicle: 
	 Year	and	Model	 Credit	Amount 
2006 Civic Hybrid CVT $2,100
2005 Civic Hybrid (SULEV) MT $1,700
2005 Civic Hybrid (SULEV) CVT $1,700
2005 Insight CVT $1,450
2006 Insight CVT $1,450 
2006 Accord Hybrid AT $1,300* 
2005 Accord Hybrid AT $650 
*($650 credit if vehicle does not have updated control calibration)
See Harl, “Additional Items in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 16 
Agric. L. Dig. 131 (2005). IR-2006-86. 
LONG-DISTANCE PHONE CALL TAX. The IRS has 
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announced that it will no longer collect the 3 percent excise 
tax, under I.R.C. § 4251, effective July 31, 2006. Taxpayers 
will	be	allowed	to	file	for	a	refund	of	the	taxes	paid	on	their	
2006 return, either by documenting the tax paid or using a safe 
harbor amount. IR-2006-82. 
RENEWABLE ELECTRICITy PRODuCTION 
CREDIT. The taxpayer was a limited liability company 
which owned another LLC which entered into wind leases 
with landowners for the construction of wind turbines which 
produced electricity. The electricity produced beyond the needs 
of the turbines was sold to utility companies. The IRS ruled that 
the taxpayer was eligible for I.R.C. § 45 renewable electricity 
production credit for turbines placed in service before January 
1, 2008. Ltr. Rul. 200620004, Nov. 2, 2005. 
RETuRNS. The IRS has posted to its web site, www.irs.
ustreas.gov, in the Forms & Pubs section Publication 4302 (Rev. 
05-06),	A	Charity’s	Guide	to	Vehicle	Donation. 
STOCK OPTIONS. The taxpayer was employed as a 
computer software designer. The taxpayer agreed to a lower 
salary in exchange for options to purchase stock in the company. 
The taxpayer exercised the options by borrowing money in a 
margin account which was secured by the purchased stock. The 
margin account was also used to purchase luxury items and real 
estate. After purchasing the stock, the taxpayer had the right 
to the stock, receive dividends for the stock and to pledge the 
stock	as	collateral.	The	company’s	success	faltered	and	the	stock	
price fell, resulting in several margin calls on the account. The 
margin	calls	were	paid	with	loans	from	the	company’s	owners.	
Eventually, all the stock was sold to meet the margin calls. 
The taxpayer excluded from income the value of the exercised 
stock options in the tax year the options were exercised, arguing 
that the stock was subject to substantial risk of forfeiture and 
was non-transferable; therefore, the value of the stock options 
was income only in the tax year in which the stock was sold to 
cover the margin calls. The court found that, upon the exercise 
of the options, the taxpayer had full control and possession of 
the stock, could vote the stock, pledge the stock as collateral 
and receive any dividends from the stock; therefore, the value 
of the options was included in income when the options were 
exercised. Facq v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-111. 
uNRELATED BuSINESS INCOME. The taxpayer was 
a fraternal society corporation exempt from income tax under 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(2). The taxpayer constructed two buildings, 
one	of	which	will	contain	a	new	lodge	on	the	first	floor	and	
residential apartments on the remaining floors. The other 
building will contain only residential apartments. Parking spaces 
were also constructed which the apartment residents can rent. 
The taxpayer will provide maintenance and utilities for the 
buildings. The IRS ruled that the income from the apartments 
and parking spaces will be unrelated business income if the 
construct	is	financed	with	debt	until	the	debt	has	been	repaid,	
at which time the rental income will no longer be unrelated 
business income. Ltr. Rul. 200621031, March 1, 2006. 
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NuISANCE 
LANDLORD LIABILITy. The plaintiffs owned a rural 
residence and the defendant landlord owned neighboring farm land 
to the south and north of the plaintiffs. The tenant defendant leased 
the north and south properties from the defendant landlord, owned 
a	hog	 confinement	 facility	 across	 the	 road	 from	 the	 plaintiffs’	
residence,	and	spread	manure	from	the	hog	operation	on	the	fields	
leased	from	the	 landlord.	The	plaintiffs	filed	a	nuisance	action	
against both defendants and the trial court dismissed the action
against the landlord, ruling that the landlord had no control over 
the	actions	of	the	tenant.	The	court	first	held	that	the		Restatement 
Second of Torts, Section 837 applied to determine the liability of a 
landlord for a nuisance caused by the actions of a tenant. The court 
held that the landlord was improperly dismissed from the case 
because there was substantial evidence that Section 837 applied to 
make the landlord liable for the negligence: (1) the landlord would 
be liable for the nuisance if the landlord carried on the activity;
(2) the landlord consented to the spreading of the manure, based 
on statements by the landlord that the landlord expected the tenant 
to	spread	the	manure	on	the	fields;	and	(3)	the	landlord	knew	the	
tenant’s	activity	would	give	rise	to	a	nuisance,	based	on	the	long	
history of complaints by the plaintiffs about the manure spreading 
on	the	south	field	before	the	tenant	leased	the	north	field.	The	court	 
noted that, although Iowa law generally protects a landlord from 
nuisances	caused	by	tenants,	the	landlord’s	unique	involvement	
with	the	tenant	and	the	plaintiffs	raises	a	fact	issue	sufficient	to	
overcome summary judgment for the landlord. The court noted 
that the landlord had allowed the tenant to renew the lease even 
after ample notice of the possibility of a nuisance. Tetzlaff v. 
Camp, No. 63/04-1499 (Iowa June 2, 2006). 
NEGLIGENCE 
CHEMICAL EMISSIONS. The plaintiffs owned dairy 
farms	near	 the	defendant’s	factory.	In	the	1970s,	 the	plaintiffs’	
cows began to show symptoms of undetermined illnesses and 
the plaintiffs made many attempts over several years to discover 
the cause of the problem, testing the feed, water and air for 
various microbes and chemicals. The plaintiffs even contacted the 
defendant for possible chemical emissions and were told that no 
harmful, illegal emissions were produced by the factory. Although 
the Pennsylvania Department of the Environment conducted 
tests	for	fluoride	and	discovered	higher	levels	of	fluoride	in	the	
vegetation	 near	 the	 plaintiffs’	 farms,	 the	 test	 results	 were	 not	
sent to the plaintiffs, although the results were available to the 
public on request. The defendant had asked the PDE to keep the 
results	confidential	but	 the	 request	was	 rejected.	The	plaintiffs	
continued to seek expert advice and were told that the problem
was	farm-specific	and	were	told	specifically	that	the	problem	was	
not	fluoride.	The	problem	was	finally	determined	in	1999	when	a	
study	showed	that	the	cows	had	fluorosis	from	eating	vegetation	
with	high	 levels	of	fluoride.	The	plaintiff	brought	an	action	 in	
2001	 seeking	 damages	 from	 fluoride	poisoning	 resulting	 from	 
fluoride	 emissions	 at	 the	 factory.	The	 claims	 include	 trespass,	
nuisance, negligent interference with business, outrageous conduct 
and negligence. The trial court dismissed all claims as barred by 
the two-year statute of limitations. The plaintiffs argued that the 
“discovery rule” applied to toll the statute of limitations because
the plaintiff was unable to discover the cause of the injury after
exercising due diligence to discover the cause. The court agreed, 
holding	that	the	plaintiffs’	extensive	efforts	to	discover	the	cause	
of	the	illness	together	with	the	misdiagnoses	that	fluoride	was	not	
the	cause	of	the	cows’	illness,	raised	a	material	issue	of	fact	as	to	
whether the plaintiffs exercised due diligence to discover the cause 
of the illness. In addition, the court held that the misrepresentations 
of the defendant as to the chemicals emitted from the factory also 
raised an issue of fact that could support tolling the statute of 
limitations under the fraudulent concealment doctrine. Mest v. 
Cabot, 2006 u.S. App. LEXIS 13460 (3d Cir. 2006), rev’g and 
rem’g, 2004 u.S. Dist. LEXIS 9112 (E.D. Pa. 2004). 
PROPERTy 
PARTITION. The plaintiffs owned farm land as co-owners 
with a bank and were ordered by the trial court to partition the land 
by sale. The plaintiffs argued that the land should be partitioned
in-kind, with owelty (money given to compensate for minor 
inequality	in	the	partition	in-kind),	because	the	plaintiffs’	child	
lived on the property and farmed it. The court noted that partition, 
in	itself,	generally	prejudices	both	parties’	interest	in	the	land	but	
the controlling factor is which method of partition prejudices the 
parties the least. The evidence of an appraiser was that the higher 
value would be obtained from a partition sale. The plaintiffs also 
argued	that	partition	in-kind	was	required	to	protect	the	child’s	
homestead interest in the property, but the court held that the 
homestead status of the property was irrelevant to the issue of 
the proper partition method. Finally, the plaintiffs argued that 
their preferred method of partition should be used because the 
bank was prohibited from owning farm land under the Minnesota 
corporate farming act, Minn. Stat. § 500.24. The court noted that 
an exception applied where a corporation acquired farm land 
by	process	of	law	and	collection	of	a	debt;	therefore,	the	bank’s	
temporary ownership of the farmland did not prevent partition
by sale. The case is designated as unpublished. Minnwest Bank, 
M.V. v. Meyers, 2006 Minn. App. unpub. LEXIS 527 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2006). 
STATE REGuLATION OF 
AGRICuLTuRE 
FIELD BuRNING. Under Idaho Code § 22-4803, the Director 
of the Department ofAgriculture is to make an annual determination 
as	 to	whether	 there	 exist	 viable	 economic	 alternatives	 to	 field	 
burning for bluegrass farmers. In 2004 the Director determined
that	there	was	no	viable	economical	alternative	to	field	burning;	 
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therefore,	under	Idaho	Code	§	22-4803A,	field	burning	could	not	
constitute a nuisance or trespass. The plaintiffs challenged the 
Director’s	determination	as	arbitrary,	capricious	and	an	abuse	of	
discretion. The court held that the determination was not an abuse 
of discretion because the determination had no discretionary 
effect because it was based on facts. The court also held that the 
determination was not arbitrary or capricious because the Director 
gave adequate consideration to large amounts of data and testimony. 
The	court	stated	that	the	mere	fact	that	field	burning	was	banned	in	
other states where bluegrass was still grown did not disprove the 
determination that no viable economic alternative was available in 
Idaho. American LungAss’n of Idaho/Nevada v. State of Idaho, 
130 P.3d 1082 (Idaho 2006). 
POTATOES. The plaintiff was a potato processor who elected 
to	have	the	plaintiff’s	end	product,	french	fries,	inspected	by	state	
inspectors instead of federal inspectors. The state charged inspection 
fees. The plaintiff changed to private inspectors and petitioned the 
state for a refund of a portion of the fees to the extent the Oregon 
Department of Agriculture had charged fees in excess of those 
needed to pay the inspection costs and the costs of administration. 
The plaintiff argued that Or. Rev. Stat. limited the inspection fees 
to the actual costs of the inspections, including administrative 
costs. The refund request was based on Or. Rev. Stat. § 293.445(2) 
which provided for refund of fees levied in excess of an amount 
legally due to an agency. The refunds could not be made more than 
three years after the initial payment to the agency. Although the 
plaintiff paid the inspection fees more than three years before its 
refund	claim,	the	plaintiff	argued	that	the	legislature’s	continuing	
appropriation of funds for the refunds allowed the agency to make 
refunds more than three years after the initial payment. The court 
held that the appropriations of the legislature did not affect the 
clear three year limitation on payment of refunds and held that 
the	 plaintiff’s	 refund	 claim	 was	untimely.	 J.R. Simplot Co. v. 
Department of Agriculture, 131 P.3d 162, aff’g, 96 P.3d 1262 
(Or. Ct. App. 2004). 
IN THE NEWS 
FuNGICIDES. Leatherleaf fern farmers in Costa Rica have 
been awarded $113 million in damages in their lawsuit alleging 
that		E.I.	DuPont	de	Nemours	&	Company’s	fungicide,	Benlate,	
permanently	damaged	the	plaintiffs’	crops.	The	plaintiffs	provided	 
96 
scientific	 evidence	 demonstrating	 how	 the	 fungicide	 harmed	
the	 plants	 which	 was	 sufficient	 to	 overcome	 the	 alternative	
explanations offered by the defendant for the crop damage. 
Environmental News Service, May 18, 2006; www.ens-
newswire.com. 
HAy AND GRAIN TRACING. The FDA has published 
a fact sheet on hay and grain recordkeeping required under 
the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act of 2002. The fact sheet notes that the following 
entities and persons are excluded from the recordkeeping 
requirements: (1) farms; foreign persons, except for foreign 
persons who transport food in the U.S.; (3) restaurants are 
excluded entirely, combination restaurant/retail facility is 
excluded entirely if sales of food it prepares and sells to 
consumers for immediate consumption are more than 90 percent 
of its total food sales; (4) persons performing covered activities 
with food to the extent that the food is within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of Agriculture; (5) persons 
who manufacture, process, pack, transport, distribute, receive, 
hold, or import food for personal consumption; (6) persons who 
receive	or	hold	food	on	behalf	of	specific	individual	consumers	
and who are not also parties to the transaction and who are 
not in the business of distributing food; and (7) persons who 
manufacture, process, pack, transport, distribute, receive, hold, 
or import food packaging (the outer packaging of food that bears 
the label and does not contact the food), except for those persons 
who also engage in a covered activity with respect to food. See 
www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/fsbtac23.html. 
AMERICAN AGRICuLTuRAL 
LAW ASSOCIATION ANNuAL 
CONFERENCE 
The 27th annual agricultural law symposium will be held 
October 13-14, 2006 at the Hyatt Regency Hotel on the Savannah 
riverfront in Savannah, GA. Information about the symposium 
program and registration materials are available at www.aglaw-
assn.org Contact Robert P. Achenbach, AALA Executive 
Director at RobertA@aglaw-assn.org   
